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THE NEED FOR MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES IN PLANNING 
Harold A. Linstone */ 
1. Introduction 
The use of analysis in the public sector during the 1970s presented the 
planner with impressive global computer models - from "The Limits to 
Growth" to "Global 2000". As Jay Forrester (1971: 18) observed in his 
influential "World Dynamics", 
All systems that change through time can be represented by 
using only levels and rates. The two kinds of variables are 
necessary but at the same time sufficient for representing 
any system. 
In the private sector corporate planning groups flourished and 
strategic planning focused on econometric forecasts, business unit 
models, growth and market share matrices, and experience curves. 
A decade later disillusionment is widespread. Consider the 
following headlines on strategic planning in the private sector: 
The Real World Strikes Back: Corporate Strategists under 
Fire. 
Fortune, Dec. 27, 1982 
The (Economic) Forecasters Flunk: Poor predictions give once 
prestigious pundits a dismal reputation. 
Time, Aug. 27, 1984 
The New Breed of Strategic Planner: Number crunching profes-
sionals are giving way to line managers. 
Business Week, Sept. 17, 1984 
And in the public sector we read: 
The more ambitious the model, the more likely is the frater-
nity of futurists to ignore fatal flaws and defer to it as a 
landmark. 
(Hoos; 1983:236) 
In World Dynamics and The Limits to Growth the scope is 
unbounded but the insights are slight. 
(Berlinski; 1976:85) 
*_/ The views expressed in this work are the sole responsability 
of the author and do not necessarily coincide with those of 
the Organization. 
There is recognition that real-life planning must deal with 
ill-structured or "wicked" problems, rather than with well-structured 
or "tame" ones. As a result, a recent UN-supported studys 
reject(s) the "grand design' approach to development. "Grand 
design' solutions are appropriate only when there is a shared 
understanding of "the problem' and complete knowledge of the 
causes of "the problem'. 
(Thompson and Warburton; 1985:10) 
We shall first examine the familiar analytic approach and then 
propose a means to cope with its weaknesses, indeed to bridge the 
gap between the modeler and the real world, between analysis and 
action. 
2. The Traditional Perspective 
Let us consider some of the familiar characteristics of science and 
technology—based analysis methodology and set them in the context of 
development planning: 
a) Shared understanding of the "problem' 
There is a single definition of the problem to be "solved'. There 
is agreement on the objectives or goals. In fact, a cultural homoge-
neity must be assumed which does not exist in development planning 
problems encountered in the real world. Each interested party may 
define the "problem' differently and have conflicting objectives. 
b) Search for the "best' or optimal solution 
Cost-benefit analysis and linear programming are typical of this 
search. Organizations do not usually seek optimal solutions; they have 
an agenda and seek a workable solution to the top problem so they 
can move on to the next one. 
c) Abstraction or reductionism; reliance on models 
Forrester's world dynamics model offers an example of this 
process. His model contains only five levels - population, pollution, 
natural resources, capital investment, and capital investment in 
agriculture. Assuming only one interaction between any two subsets of 
these five elements, we have almost a thousand possible interactions. 
(The formula is (2n-l)^, where n is the number of elements; in this 
case the formula gives 961.) In reality there are, of course, multiple 
interactions possible between any two subsets, so the number given 
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here is a lower limit. The simplifying assumptions that (l)n = 5 
yields a meaningful image of the world and (2) the structure of the 
model remains invariant over the 200-year model run, stretch the bounds 
of credulity. Indeed, the superficially impressive number of equations 
used in the world model gives a misleading aura of model sophistication 
and masks the "ineffable innocence' of the analysis (Berlinski; 
1976:83). 
Econometric models may contain 1000 equations but executives using 
their intuition usually beat the models in short-term forecasting. As 
Ascher's examination (1978) concluded, the core assumptions are much 
more crucial to forecast accuracy than the model sophistication. 
Economic journals are filled with mathematical formulas 
leading the reader from sets of more or less plausible but 
entirely arbitrary assumptions to precisely stated but 
irrelevant theoretical conclusions. 
W. Leontief, 1973 Nobel Laureate in 
Economics, quoted in Time, Aug. 27, 
1984;43 
d) Reliance on data 
The urge for quantification, a hallmark of science and technology, 
has also become pervasive in planning. The principle: If it cannot be 
quantified, it cannot be very important and may be neglected. Even 
when experts do present quantified facts, there may be enormous 
variation. Per capita fuel consumption rate estimates developed by 
experts for one recent UN-supported study varied by a factor of 67 
(Thompson and Warburton; 1985:5). 
Measures are used for the future because they were appropriate in 
the past. Gross national product is a suitable measure for an indus-
trial society; it is of questionable value for a pre-industrial as well 
as a post-industrial society. The concept of the "job' may need to be 
redefined in an information era. 
e) Predictability 
Prigogine et .al. (1977) find that a system shifting from one 
stable phase to another experiences temporary "macroscopic indeter-
minacy". The new state may depend on one fluctuation that is itself of 
no significance. 
Another aspect has to do with increasing technological complexity 
and is directly related to the discussion in c). A system which 
consists of many elements, and therefore many interactions, also has 
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many possibilities of failure. Proper design can reduce the possibil-
ities of failure, but cannot eliminate them. The situation is partic-
ularly serious when the coupling or linkage between its subsystems is 
tight, so that subunits cannot be separated in an accident (Perrow, 
1984). 
In the event that the consequence of failure is catastrophic and 
unacceptable to the society, the traditional probability calculus is 
irrelevant. An event with a small likelihood, say, but resulting 
in 107 fatalities if it does occur, has a calculated expected value of 
102 deaths. Such prediction is clearly meaningless. The evolving 
world has an increasing number of such complex systems with the 
potential of catastrophic failure - Three Mile Island, Bhopal, and 
Chernobyl are recent examples. 
Impact assessment has proven to be more difficult than forecast-
ing. The technology of the spinning wheel had an impact on mass 
communications; the technology of the chimney had an impact on social 
stratification (White, 1974). Today we ponder the impact of in-
formation technology. Will it mean more centralization or decen-
tralization? Will it worsen the handicap of illiteracy or move us back 
to audiovisual learning? 
f) Objectivity 
The planner is assumed to be an objective observer and truth is 
observer-invariant. In the complex real world virtually everything 
interacts with everything, and this includes the planner. The indi-
vidual is unique and makes a difference. 
To be able to see the world globally, which you are going to 
have to be able to do, and to see it as a world of unique 
individuals ... that is really complexity. 
(Churchman; 1977:90) 
g) Time 
Time is assumed to move linearly at a universally accepted pace, 
with no consideration of differential time perceptions, planning 
horizons, and discount rates. The experiments of Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974) demonstrate how human beings apply a psychological discount rate 
to their own past and thus distort the integration of their own 
experience, that is, their subjective probability. Recent events tend 
to be overstressed in comparison to more remote ones. Similarly, we 
look at the future as if through the wrong end of a telescope: distant 
crises or opportunities appear smaller than they actually are. Such 
discounting of the future drastically affects the choice between 
project alternatives. 
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The planner often exhibits a discounting tendency in focusing on 
the analysis and neglecting the subsequent implementation of his or her 
plan. It is a fatal flaw. 
Having briefly described the inadequacies of the traditional 
perspective - which we shall label the technical (or T) perspective -
we propose the use of multiple perspectives to overcome its 
limitations. 
3. Multiple Perspectives 
Graham Allison's probing study of the Cuban missile crisis (1971) 
provided the stimulus for the introduction and development of the 
multiple perspective concept. We use three types of perspective: the 
technical (or T) sketched in Section 2, the organizational/societal (or 
0), and the personal/individual (or P). Table 1 compares the main 
characteristics. Any complex system can be viewed from diverse 
perspectives. For example, an organization can be viewed from the T 
perspective, as Forrester (1961) did in analyzing the firm using his 
system dynamics, or from the 0 perspective, as Machiavelli did in his 
guidelines for rulers (more recently adapted to the modern corporation 
by Jay (1968). Physical risk may be viewed from a T perspective 
(probabilistic risk analysis) or a P perspective (perceived risk). 
Each perspective yields insights not provided by the others. 
There are usually several important 0 and P perspectives, repre-
senting affected and affecting organizational and individual actors. 
The decision maker has his own process of integration of the perspec-
tives. Searching for a weighting formula would be as futile as asking 
an executive how he weighs the input he receives from his staff, his 
department heads, and his personal friends in reaching a major decision 
on a new line of business. Presentation of the different perspectives 
together with a prototype integration (analogous to the courtroom trial 
witness testimonies plus the summation by the prosecutor and defense 
attorney) is usually desirable. A most important task is the probing 
of the interplay of perspectives, some supporting, others conflicting 
in nature. 
It should be noted that individuals who are excellent in pursuing 
the T perspective are not necessarily appropriate in developing 0 or P 
perspectives. The hard or soft science training that usually forms a 
solid base for T is by no means ideal for 0 or P. The modes of inquiry 
(Churchman; 1971) are quite different: the data and model based modes 
of T give way to the dialectic/adversary and negotiated-reality/consen-
sual modes of 0, and the intuitive, experiential, and learning modes of 
P. Input for 0 and P is obtained in personal, in-depth interviews, not 
drawn from written reports. 
6 
In planning activities the T perspective plays the dominant role 
in looking at alternative directions for the decision maker, but the 0 
and P perspectives become crucial for effective implementation. The 
analyst's preoccupation with T readily explains his or her frequent 
disinterest in implementation of the plan. We also note that 0 and P 
must deal with people, either in groups or as individuals - an aspect 
often uncomfortable for the ivory-tower planner. 
In their analysis of political forecasting, Ascher and Overholt 
sweep in both 0 and P perspectives. They make clear distinctions 
between the policy maker's "rational information needs" (that is, the 
meaning of information, the degree of certainty) and his or her 
political needs. They explain the political needs as follows: (1) to 
be a convincing advocate of preferred policies, (2) whenever possible, 
to choose policies which, if implemented, produce positive results, (3) 
when wrong, not to be desastrously so, (4) when wrong, to minimize the 
blame focused on the policy maker, and (5) to maintain his decision-
making discretion (1983:45). They recognize that quantitative indices 
are deceptively hazardous, that the law of large numbers, aggregate 
statistical techniques, and linear relationships are inappropriate. 
The 0 perspective is their "central metaphor" and concern for the P 
perspective is reflected in statements such as the following: 
long-range strategic thinking is qualitatively different from 
short-range tactical thinking - frequently to the extent of 
requiring different personalities ... 
for the analyst the use of sophisticated methods brings 
several rewards: personal feelings of mastery, ... peer 
approval, (and) persuasiveness to the extent that the 
scientific aura of complex methods makes the results seem 
"scientific' 
(Ascher and Overholt; 1983:40,52) 
Thompson and Warburton (1985:17) analyze development planning in 
the Himalayas and conclude: 
The classic development approach has been to sound the alarm 
and then, confident that the country's attention has been 
gained, to tell it what will have to be done if it is to 
avoid losing its resource base. It has not worked. It has 
not because it has ignored (as if it were some mere detail 
of implementation) the deep political, economic and cultural 
structure that is, in fact, what determines the country's 
attention and lack of attention. What is needed is a more 
sensitive approach; an approach that places the "mere 
details' - the institutions that constitute this d e e p 
structure - at the very centre of the stage and relegates to 
the wings the alarm bellringers and their immaculate pres-
criptions. 




















Product (study, design, 
explanation) 
Abstraction and modeling 
Data and analysis 
Technological time 
Far 
Often little breadth 
Minimal 
Problem simplification by 
limiting variables, relations 
Cause and effect 
Need for validation, 




Optimization (best solution) 
Feedback loops recognized 
Quantification 
Use of averages, probabilities 
Trade-olfs 
Uncertainties notedr many 
caveats ( "on one 
hand . . . " ) 
Technical report, briefing 
Stability and continuity 
Process 
Action and implementation 
Dialectic/adversary 






Problem delegation to others or 
avoidance if possible 
Agenda ("problem oi the moment") 
Bureaucracy often pervasive 
Political sensitivity and expediency 
Loyalties, credentials 
Restricted access by outsiders (caste) or 
recruits members (seel) 
Reasonableness, common advantage 
Recognition of partial unpredictability 
Long-range planning often ritualized 
Satisfying (first acceptable, rather than 
best, solution) 
Incremental change, slow adaptation 
Parochial priorities 
Standard operating procedures 
Compromise and bargaining 
Monitoring and correction 
Uncertainties avoided 
Fear of error 
Directive, conference, interview 
Private language with insiders 
Hortatory language with public 
Power, influence, prestige 
Status maintenance or improvement 





High (with rare exceptions) 
Hierarchy of individual needs 
(security, acceptance, self-
fulfillment) 
Challenge and response 
Each construes attributes of others 
Inner world 
(subjectivity) 
Need for certainty, beliefs 
Creativity and vision of the few 
Cope with few alternatives or 
variab/oi only 
Filter out images Inconsistent with 
past experience 
Came playing ("homo ludens") 
Focus on simplistic hypotheses rather 
than scanning many 
Leaders and followers, mystique 
Fear of change and unknown 
Narrative (story), discussion, speech 
Importance of personality 
Tabic 1: Multiple perspectives. 

In their case, the traditional T perspective - the biophysical analysis 
- must yield the spotlight to the 0 perspective: 
(Oj) micro-social 
The framework of land tenure within the village and the patterns 
of local social relationships lead to a differentiation in strategies 
between the cautious cultivators (for whom land is wealth) and the 
adventurous traders (for whom individualized exchange is wealth). 
(O2) macro-social 
The trans-boundary problems are the focus: what happens in one 
country is seen as having unfortunate downstream effects in another 
country. Mutually satisfactory national policies and their implemen-
tation are of prime concern. 
It is the interaction or cross-cuing among T, Oj, and O2 that is 
crucial to effective planning for development in this region. 
4. Implications of the Use of Multiple Perspectives 
In this final section we speculate on the kinds of insights which the 
perspectives are likely to bring to the surface in the area of develop-
ment planning. They are based on several of the sources quoted in this 
paper. 
T perspective: 
. The dominant technology for the next twenty-five years is informa-
tion technology. Rapid advances in data processing, storage, and 
communication will mean that "information is the coin of the realm". 
- Information technology can provide the ability to a develop-
ing country to leapfrog in its advance. For example, 
learning through visual means (video cassettes, networks) can 
overcome lags in literacy and lack of trained teachers. 
- Information technology can overcome the discounting problem 
(Linstone; 1984:350). 
. The possibilities of unacceptable technology-based catastrophes 
are multiplying. 
- Identification of complex, tightly coupled systems in which 
failure results in enormous consequences can make the 
elimination of such systems more likely (Perrow; 1984). 
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. Greater process orientation and institutional focus improves 
planning effectiveness (Linstone; 1984:331-352). 
More attention is focused on matching technological with 
social change. 
- The bottom-up development process is matched with the 
top-down development project (Thompson art d Warbtittonj 
1985:29). 
In industrial development the planner's attention is balanced 
more equitably between (a) technology and (b) management/ 
manufacturing/marketing. In other words, the gap - between 
planning and implementation is reduced. 
Adaptability, flexibility, and crisis management arfc empha-
sized in the development process. 
P perspective: 
There is more focus on the identification and nourishing of 
individuals with vital talents rather than merely itoproveifetit in 
education and training. 
Leaders are needed: individuals with a vision, the ability to 
engage others in its pursuit, and personal staging power. 
- Entrepreneurs are needed: risk takers. 
- Managers are needed (in distinction to bureaucrats). 
The multiple perspective concept has proven to b6 an Effective 
means to bridge the gap between analysis and action, between the 
modeler and the real world. Its conscious application to de^ feioprifent 
planning holds significant promise. 
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